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Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation, by D.Z. Phillips, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp xiv + 330 ISBN 0-52180368-3 (hardback), ISBN 0-52100846-8 (paperback). $70.00 hardback, $25.00 paperback.
ANTHONY RUDD, St. Olaf College
This book, D.Z. Phillips tells us in his preface, started as a revision of his
Religion Without Explanation (1976), a classic Wittgensteinean critique of
attempts to give reductive explanations (philosophical, sociological, psychological) of religious beliefs. But, as he says, “revision became rewriting”
(xi) and this is substantially a new (and considerably longer) book, though
recognisable as a descendent of the earlier one. (6 of the 11 Chapters of
Religion Without Explanation were omitted and the remainder heavily
revised, while 8 new Chapters were added.) The book, then, needs to be
read as a new work, not simply a new edition of an old one.
In the first Chapter Phillips outlines his understanding of the way that
philosophers should approach religion. Rejecting both the apologetically
oriented “hermeneutics of recollection” and the debunking “hermeneutics
of suspicion,” he argues for a “hermeneutics of contemplation,” which
attempts to clarify and attend to the sense that is present in religious practices without either endorsing or repudiating those practices. I will return
to the question of what this “contemplation” involves and whether it represents a coherent aim for the philosopher of religion.
The main body of the book is devoted to the critique of a variety of
philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists who have
attempted to provide debunking, reductive explanations of religion. (So
the attention is all given to practitioners of the hermeneutics of suspicion;
there is no extended discussion of any of the hermeneuts of recollection.)
After a Chapter on Bernard Williams’ account of ancient Greek religion,
Phillips gives us successive Chapters on Hume, Feuerbach, Marx and
Engels, Tylor and Frazer, Marettt, Freud, Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl and Peter
Berger. There is then a Chapter discussing the development of Peter
Winch’s Wittgensteinean critique of reductive trends in sociology and
anthropology, and a brief conclusion, also drawing heavily on Winch, and
defending the idea of a “hermeneutics of contemplation.” Winch (to whose
memory the book is dedicated), Rush Rees and, of course, Wittgenstein,
figure prominently as allies and inspirations throughout the book. The
most obvious omission—in this context both glaring and baffling—is
Nietzsche. A critique of the hermeneutics of suspicion that considers
Feuerbach, Marx and Freud at length—and finds space for extended discussion of Marett and Levy-Bruhl—doesn’t have so much as a single index
entry for Nietzsche.
Phillips’ detailed discussions of the particular thinkers he does deal with
contain much that is interesting and insightful. But in the remainder of this
review I want to concentrate on his more general ambition—to make a case
for the hermeneutics of contemplation as the correct methodology for the
philosophy of religion. Phillips says that the hermeneutics of contemplation “is simply an application to religion of the more general contemplative
character of philosophy itself” (4). Philosophy as he conceives of it contem-
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plates the various kinds of discourse, forms of life or what have you, tries
to give an overview of the sense that they have, but does not try to assess
whether or not they are valid. It is concerned, one might say, with meaning, not truth.1 By insisting that understanding is not the same as believing
Phillips tries to make room for a neutral, descriptive account of a religion.
A believer and an unbeliever may be able to agree on a descriptive account
of the sense a religion has, but one will accept and the other repudiate it.
But the philosopher qua philosopher is concerned only to “contemplate
possibilities of sense” which is “different from advocating those possibilities, or finding a faith to live by in them” (5). Phillips therefore distinguishes such philosophical contemplation from both the activity of the religious
thinker who “lives in the expectancy of a new Word that has a message for
him” (5) and that of the atheist who denies that religion, taken at face
value, does make sense, and therefore wants to explain it reductively, as a
disguised manifestation of ‘natural’ psychological or social forces.
So, in contrast to many contemporary thinkers, Phillips wants to retain
the ancient ideal of the philosopher as able to transcend his or her particular standpoint and personal beliefs and enjoy (qua philosopher) a “view
from nowhere”—even though he allows that the philosopher, qua existing
human being, will want to endorse or repudiate some of the positions s/he
merely contemplates in philosophical moments. But is this neutral stance
really a possible one? Doesn’t it, as Kierkegaard would argue, involve an
ultimately untenable distinction between the philosopher and the existing
individual who does philosophy? Can one separate out description from
personal appropriation as neatly as Phillips supposes? Can, for instance, a
Christian, a Buddhist and an atheist, qua philosophers, all come to agree
on the sense of Christianity, Buddhism and atheism? How can my understanding of the possibilities of sense present in a different world-view be
isolated from the world-view that I hold? Phillips, unfortunately, does not
give us any clear or systematic discussion of such questions here. The
problem with the neutrality that he claims is brought out strikingly by his
treatment of Bernard Williams. After setting out eight “assumptions”
which he takes to govern Williams’ thinking about religion, he comments
that his aim is not “to show that the secular, humanistic perspective
Williams advocates is wrong…Rather, the aim is to question the generality
of Williams’ assumptions.” (39) But it is crucial to Williams’ secular
humanism that his anti-religious assumptions do hold universally. To
question their generality is to question his perspective as a whole.
Phillips says he opposes “that theoretical atheism which claims that all
religious beliefs are meaningless” (5). But, in line with his neutrality, he
does not want to claim (qua philosopher) that atheism is mistaken. One
might therefore think he would understand (non-confused) atheism as the
claim that religious beliefs, while meaningful, are in fact false. But this
view seems dubious in itself. Whatever may be wrong with the ontological
argument, it is surely correct to point out that the existence (or non-existence) of God cannot be a contingent matter of fact—it can’t just happen to
be the case that God either exists or doesn’t. And Phillips recognises this,
quoting approvingly from Rees (who is discussing the ontological argument): “ ‘God exists’ is not a statement of fact….It is an expression—or con-
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fession—of faith” (96). Moreover, Phillips repudiates Proudfoot’s suggestion that one should start by trying to understand the sense that religion
makes for a believer, but can then legitimately go on to develop reductive
explanations for why the believers hold those (false) beliefs. (10–17) So if
Phillips doesn’t think an atheist can say either that religious beliefs are
meaningful but false, or that they are meaningless, how can he be saying
that atheism is none the less a coherent position?
I think this difficulty takes us to the heart of what is troubling about
Phillips’ approach to the philosophy of religion. Throughout his career, he
has seemed torn between two very different but easily confused positions.
One is what I would take to be Wittgenstein’s own view; that ontological
claims, such as ‘God exists,’ can only be understood in the context of the
practices in which they are made—but that they are none the less genuinely ontological for that. The other is (a highly sophisticated version of) the
positivistic view that religious claims can only be construed as non-cognitive, as the expression or adoption of an attitude. As in most of Phillips’
works, there is a good deal of ambiguity in this book; Phillips says things
which are compatible with both positions without ever clearly distinguishing between them. But the positivism does seem to be in the ascendant. On
that view, religion is an attitude to the world which one may or may not
adopt; but no question of its truth or falsity arises. If this is what Phillips
assumes, then it would explain why he treats (unconfused) atheism purely
as an existential choice not to get involved in certain practices, not as a
judgement that religion is either false or meaningless.
Phillips is understandably annoyed at the way in which his position has
been crudely caricatured as “Wittgensteinean Fideism,” and devotes a few
pages to distinguishing his hermeneutics of contemplation from this straw
man (25–30). His central claim that understanding the sense in a set of
beliefs is different from personally appropriating those beliefs is plainly the
antithesis of the idea, widely ascribed to him, that only believers can understand what religious beliefs are. However, Phillips does nothing here to
allay the deeper worries about his approach—that it preserves religion from
(at least a certain kind of) philosophical criticism by evacuating it of its substance. He states that “Just as there is a difference between saying ‘I do not
appreciate chamber music’ and ‘there is nothing in chamber music to
appreciate’, so there would be a difference between someone’s saying that
they cannot see any sense in either religion or atheism and the claim that
there is no sense in either to be appreciated” (6). But this analogy raises precisely those worries. For it simply ignores the fact that a religion, unlike a
kind of music, makes truth-claims.2 A philosophical critic of a religion is not
just someone who doesn’t find a certain way of life attractive, but someone
who rejects the claims about the nature of reality that it makes.
That Phillips is committed to a reductive, “attitudinal” account—which
certainly fails in its stated aim of simply contemplating the sense that is
present in religious discourse—is made especially clear in Chapter 4,
where he considers Feuerbach’s claim that the belief in immortality is an
instance of wishful thinking, an attempt to evade facing up to the
inevitability of death (112–15). Phillips responds by considering various
ways in which religious beliefs could be understood as ways of facing up

BOOK REVIEWS

273

to, accepting that inevitability (116–29). What is notable is that he simply
takes for granted the truth of Feurebach’s assumption that death is the end,
that there is no conscious survival beyond death. Having a religious belief
is in this case, reduced to having a certain attitude to the agreed-on facts as
they are stated in a naturalistic metaphysics such as Feuerbach’s. I suspect
that Phillips’ ideal of neutrality is not really a coherent one; and this suspicion is somewhat encouraged by the fact that Phillips himself, rather than
simply contemplating the differences between religious and naturalistic
perspectives, ends up reducing the former so that they offer no challenge
to the truth of the latter.
NOTES
1. For a detailed argument in favour of this view of philosophy, see
Phillips’ Philosophy’s Cool Place (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1999).
2. There are actually circumstances in which I would be willing to say that
music does make truth-claims. But I don’t think Phillips is intending the analogy to be taken in this sense.

On Augustine, by Sharon M. Kaye and Paul Thomson. Wadsworth, 2001.
Pp 83. Paper $15.95; On Ockham, by Sharon M. Kaye and Robert M. Martin.
Wadsworth, 2001. Pp. 97. Paper $15.95.
JACK ZUPKO, Emory University
These two very short books offer basic introductions to the thought of
Augustine and William of Ockham. They are part of the Wadsworth
Philosophers Series under the general editorship of Daniel Kolak, a collection now comprising some forty volumes aimed at providing “a brief and
accessible insight into the ideas of major philosophers throughout history
… empowering the reader to better understand the original works of these
influential figures” (from the back cover). Although these books are
intended as stand-alone texts, the publisher suggests that they would also
be “excellent companions to, and may be bundled with, Daniel Kolak’s The
Philosophy Source, a CD-ROM that provides ready access to over 100 classic,
primary readings.” I have not examined the latter text for this review.
I mention this because the most important thing to know about these
books is that they are written for students as opposed to specialist scholars or
professional philosophers or even academics in other fields, a fact not immediately clear from the books themselves. The prose is spartan and reads like
a revised set of lecture notes, complete with the sort of hip, off-the-wall allusions undergraduate students find appealing: “the [Pyrrhonian] skeptic
would ask what color the book would appear to a Venusian equipped with
infra-red vision, or to Superman with x-ray eyes, or when viewed under
ultra-violet light” (On Augustine: 28); “Ockham’s view [on freedom] resonates well with that of the twentieth-century libertarian, Jean-Paul Sartre
(1905-1980). We are what we make ourselves to be” (On Ockham: 70). At a
certain level, it is hard to know what to make of such remarks. But anyone

